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Abstract. Although secret sharing techniques have been applied to im-
plement secure electronic sealed-bid auction for a long time, problems
and attacks still exist in secret-sharing-based electronic sealed-bid auc-
tion schemes. In this paper, a new secret-sharing-based first-bid e-auction
scheme is designed to achieve satisfactory properties and efficiency. Cor-
rectness and fairness of the new auction are based on hard computation
problems and do not depend on any trust. Complete bid privacy based
on a threshold trust is achieved in the new scheme. Attacks to existing
secret-sharing-based sealed-bid e-auction schemes are prevented.
1 Introduction
The first secure electronic sealed-bid auction scheme [3] is based on threshold se-
cret sharing. Since then, more secret-sharing-based sealed-bid e-auction schemes
[4, 6, 5, 10] have been proposed. Most of them [4, 6, 10] are supposed to support
first-bid sealed-bid e-auction. However as will be shown many security problems
exist in these auction schemes and they are vulnerable to various attacks. The
newest and most advanced of them, [10], pointed out lack of secret sharing ver-
ification and vulnerability to three attacks in the previous secret-sharing-based
sealed-bid e-auctions. However, the countermeasures in [10] cannot completely
prevent these three attacks.
In this paper, drawbacks of the previous secret-sharing-based sealed-bid e-
auction schemes are listed and analysed. Then a new secret-sharing-based sealed-
bid auction scheme is proposed, which can implement secure and efficient first-
bid sealed-bid e-auction. Several attacks in the existing secret-sharing-based
sealed-bid e-auction schemes are prevented in the new scheme.
2 Requirements and Related Work
Auction is a useful tool to distribute resources. The principle of auction is to
sell goods at the highest possible price. Sealed-bid auction usually contains four
phases: preparation phase, bidding phase, bid opening phase and winner deter-
mination phase.
1. In the preparation phase, the auction system is set up and the auction rule
is published.
2. In the bidding phase, every bidder submits a sealed bid through a commu-
nication network.
3. In the bid opening phase, the bids are opened to determine the winning
price.
4. In the winner determination phase, the winner is identified.
The following properties are often desired in sealed-bid auction.
1. Correctness: The auction result is determined according to the auction
rule. For example, if first bid auction is run, the bidder with the highest bid
wins and pays the highest bid.
2. Bid confidentiality: Each bid remains confidential to anyone other than
the bidder himself before the bid opening phase starts.
3. Fairness: No bidder can take advantage of other bidders (e.g. recover other
bids and choose or change his own bids according to other bids).
4. Unchangeability: Any bidder, especially the winner, cannot change or deny
his bid after it is submitted.
5. Public verifiability: Correctness of the auction (including validity of the
bids, correctness of bid opening and correctness of winner identification)
must be publicly verifiable.
6. Bid Privacy: Confidentiality of the losing bids must be still retained after
the auction finishes. Strictly speaking, no information about any losing bid
is revealed except what can be deduced from the auction result.
7. Robustness: The auction can still run properly in abnormal situations like
existence of invalid bid.
Commonly used sealed-bid auction rules include first bid auction and Vickrey
auction. In a first bid auction, the bidder with the highest bid wins and pays
the highest bid. In a Vickrey auction, the bidder with the highest bid wins and
pays the second highest bid. Another popular rule, the ith bid auction [5] is a
multiple-item version of first bid auction or Vickrey auction.
In a secure auction scheme, secrecy of the bid is very important. Usually, bid
confidentiality must be achieved without any trust on the auctioneers, as loss
of confidentiality is fatal to fairness of the auction. If a bidder can collude with
some auctioneers to know other bids before submitting his own bid, he can win
at a price as low as possible in a first bid auction, which violates the principle and
fairness of auction. On the other hand, bid privacy can be based on some trust,
like a threshold trust on the auctioneers as breach of a bidder’s personal privacy
is not so serious and is tolerable in some cases. Implementation of bid privacy
is rule-dependent. Although Vickery auction is preferred in many applications,
it is difficult to achieve bid privacy in Vickrey auction. As the winner’s bid and
the identity of the bidder submitting the winning bid must be kept secret as
required in bid privacy, there is no practical method to achieve bid privacy in
Vickrey auction. As bid privacy is required in this paper, we focus on first-bid
auction.
Except [3], all the secret-sharing-based sealed-bid e-auction schemes employ
one-choice-per-price strategy. Under this strategy, the price space (containing all
the biddable prices) is much smaller than the input domain of the sealing function
and each bidder must make a choice (indicating willingness or unwillingness to
pay) at every biddable price to form his bidding vector. If a bidder is willing to
pay a price, he chooses a non-zero integer standing for “YES” as his choice at that
price. If a bidder is unwilling to pay a price, he chooses zero standing for “NO” as
his choice at that price. The bidders seal their bidding vectors (including choices
at all the biddable prices) and submit the sealed bidding vectors in the bidding
phase. These sealed-bid e-auction schemes also employ additive homomorphic
secret sharing and binary search. The bidders use additive homomorphic secret
sharing (e.g. Shamir’s secret sharing [12] and its variants) to seal their bidding
choices. Then a binary search for the winning price is performed along a binary
route among the biddable prices. In the search, the auctioneers exploit additive
homomorphism of the sharing function (the summed shares of all the choices at
a price can reconstruct the sum of the choices at that price) to implement bid
opening at every price on the binary searching route until finally the winning
price is met.
Among the existing secret-sharing-based first-bid e-auction schemes [3, 4, 6,
10], the most recent and advanced one is [10]. The auction scheme in [3] is simple,
but does not support bid privacy. Secret bid sharing in [3, 4, 6] is not verifiable,
so the bids are changeable and a bidder can collude with an auctioneer to com-
promise correctness and fairness. Besides lack of verifiability [10] points out three
attacks to the previous schemes [4, 6], ABC (auctioneer-bidder collusion) attack,
BBC (bidder-bidder collusion) attack and dispute attack. In an ABC attack,
some auctioneers collude with a bidder to compromise correctness or fairness.
In a BBC attack, some bidders collude to compromise correctness or fairness.
In a dispute attack, an auctioneer accuses a bidder of submitting an invalid
(encrypted) choice share and the bidder cannot prove his innocence without re-
vealing the share. However, the auction scheme in [10] cannot completely prevent
these three attacks.
The auction scheme in [10] prevented an ABC attack in [4, 6]: an auctioneer
helps a bidder to change his bid after submitting it. However, [10] is vulnerable
to another ABC attack in first-bid auction. As bid sealing depends on threshold
secret sharing, any submitted sealed bid can be opened before the bid opening
phase if the number of malicious auctioneers is over the sharing threshold. These
malicious auctioneers can reveal the opened bids to a waiting colluding bidder,
who can bid just higher than the submitted bids and win at a price as low as
possible. This attack is an ABC attack and definitely compromises fairness of
the auction. Although a threshold trust on the auctioneers is assumed in [10]
and this ABC attack does not exist under the threshold trust, this threshold
trust assumption is too strong for correctness and fairness of the auction. It is
appropriate to base less important properties like bid privacy on the threshold
trust assumption. However, as stated before, bid confidentiality must be achieved
without any trust on the auctioneers as it affects correctness and fairness of the
auction. So this ABC attack against correctness and fairness must be prevented
without any assumption on the auctioneers.
The existing secret-sharing-based sealed-bid e-auction schemes are vulnerable
to BBC attack as well. For example, three colluding bidders B1, B2 and B3 may
perform the following attack against first bid auction where in a bidding choice
no-zero integer Y and 0 stand for “YES” and “NO” respectively.
– B1, B2 and B3 estimate that other bidders’ bids are lower than pµ while
their own evaluation is pν , which is higher than pµ. They try to win the
auction and pay as low as possible.
– B1 bids Y at prices no higher than pµ and zero at other prices; B2 bids Y
at prices no higher than pν and zero at other prices; B3 bids −Y at prices
higher than pµ but no higher than pν and zero at other prices.
– If all other bidder submits a bid lower than pµ as expected, the sum of choices
at pµ is non-zero and the sum of choices at prices higher than pµ is 0. So
pµ is the winning price and there is a tie between B1 and B2. One of them
gives up and the other wins at pµ.
– If other bidders’ highest bid, pH is no lower than pµ but lower than pν , the
sum of choices at pH is larger than zero and the sum of choices at prices
higher than pH is 0. So some other bidder wins the auction at pH together
with B2. B2 disputes the tie and publishes his bid to win the auction at pν .
– If other bidders’ highest bid is pν , the sum of choices at pν is larger than
zero and the sum of choices at prices higher than pν is 0. So some other
bidder draws with B2 at pν . B2 still has a chance to win the auction in the
following tie-breaking operation.
With this attack, either B1 or B2 win unless another bidder submits a bid higher
than the attackers’ evaluation. The attackers can pay a price lower than their
evaluation if the other bids are as low as the attackers expect.
It is pointed out in [10] that the previous secret-sharing-based e-auction
schemes [3, 4, 6, 5] are not publicly verifiable when bid privacy must be retained.
As a result of lack of pubic verifiability, these schemes cannot deal with dispute
between bidders and auctioneers, so are vulnerable to the dispute attack. To
prevent the dispute attack, [10] suggests to use publicly verifiable secret sharing
(PVSS) to distribute the bids. A PVSS protocol based on Bao’s proof of equality
of logarithms in different cyclic groups with different orders [1] is proposed in
[10]. However, Bao’s proof is neither specially sound nor zero knowledge. Bao
only used it in a special verifiable encryption scheme, where he believes sound-
ness and ZK property of the proof is not necessary. Application of Bao’s proof in
[10] is not appropriate. The PVSS in [10] cannot prevent the dispute attack as in-
valid bid can pass its verification. Moreover, the PVSS reveals some information
about the bids.
To protect bid confidentiality and privacy when the bidding choices are in
a small set, information-theoretically hiding secret sharing scheme proposed by
Pedersen [9] is employed in [10] to share the bidding choices, whose compu-
tational and communication cost is twice as high as a computationally hiding
verifiable secret sharing scheme like [8]. However, as will be shown later in the
new auction scheme in this paper a computationally hiding verifiable secret shar-
ing is enough to protect bid confidentiality and privacy if the auction protocol is
well designed. Although information-theoretically hiding property is achieved in
the bid sharing in [10] at a high cost, bids in that scheme are not information-
theoretically confidential and not even semantically confidential as Paillier en-
cryption is simplified in [10] to lose semantic security. In addition, bid privacy is
not complete in [10]. At every price on the binary searching route, the number
of “YES” choices is revealed.
In this paper, a new secret-sharing-based first-bid e-auction is designed, which
can prevent the three attacks and achieve complete bid privacy more efficiently.
3 Pedersen’s Verifiable Secret Sharing
Since Shamir proposed the first threshold secret sharing scheme [12], many
threshold secret sharing techniques have appeared. Using these techniques, a
secret holder can share a secret among multiple share holders. The secret can be
recovered if the number of cooperating share holders is over a certain threshold,
T . If the secret holder is not trusted, there must be a mechanism the share hold-
ers can use to verify that they get a set of valid shares of a unique secret. This
requirement is very important for the robustness of applications like auctions.
Secret sharing with this mechanism is called VSS (verifiable secret sharing).
Shamir’s secret sharing was extended by Pedersen to be verifiable as follows [8].
1. G is the subgroup of Z∗p with order q where p and q are large primes such
that q divides p− 1. Integer g is a generator of G.
2. A builds a polynomial f(x) =
∑T
j=0 ajx
j where a0 = s and aj for j =
1, 2, . . . , T are random integers.
3. A publishes Ej = gaj for j = 0, 1, . . . , T .
4. A sends si = f(i) as a share to share holder Pi.
5. Pi verifies gsi =
∏T
j=0E
ij
j . If the verification is passed, Pi can be sure that
si is the ith share of logg E0.
6. If at least T + 1 share holders get correct shares, logg E0 can be recovered
by them corporately.
In this paper, Pedersen’s verifiable secret sharing will be employed, which
has the following three properties.
– Correctness: if the secret holder follows the VSS protocol, he can share his
secret such that each share can pass the verification.
– Soundness: if the verification is passed, any share set containing more than
T shares can be used to recover secret logg E0.
– Homomorphism: if multiple secrets are shared among the same sets of share
holders, they can sum up the shares to recover the sum of the secrets.
4 The New Auction Scheme
The basic structure of a secret-sharing-based sealed-bid e-auction is inherited in
this new scheme. As in other secret-sharing-based sealed-bid e-auction schemes,
bidders share their bids among the auctioneers, who employ homomorphic bid
opening and binary search to determine the winning price. However, in the
new auction schemes, certain measures are taken to prevent the attacks and
overcome the drawbacks in existing secret-sharing-based sealed-bid e-auction
schemes. Two rounds of communication are employed between the bidders and
the auctioneers, while only one round of communication is employed in the ex-
isting schemes.
In the first round the bidders commit to their bids and publish the commit-
ments. The committing function is information-theoretically hiding, so that it
is impossible for anyone to recover any bid from the commitments. The com-
mitting function is computationally binding, so that to find two different ways
to open the commitments is as hard as the discrete logarithm problem. In the
second round the bidders share the bid opening information among the auction-
eers through an additive homomorphic VSS mechanism, so that the auctioneers
can cooperate to recover the sum of the bidding choices. The hiding property
of the committing function prevents ABC attack, while the binding property of
the committing function guarantees unchangeability. The auctioneers randomize
the bidding choices before they are summed, so that BBC attack is prevented.
The verifiable secret sharing in [8] is employed in the new scheme, which is
additive homomorphic and efficient. A dispute-settling function based on that
VSS technique and verifiable encryption is designed to settle disputes on valid-
ity of encrypted shares. As the bidding choices are randomized before they are
summed, no information about losing bids is revealed although the sum of the
bidding choices is published at the prices on the binary searching route.
Suppose there are w biddable prices p1, p2, . . . , pw in decreasing order, n
bidders B1, B2, . . . , Bn and m auctioneers A1, A2, . . . , Am. The auction protocol
is as follows.
1. Preparation phase
A bulletin board is set up as a broadcast communication channel. Each
Aj establishes his Paillier encryption [7]) algorithm with public key Nj
(product of two secret large primes) and gj (whose order is a multiple of
Nj), message space ZNj , multiplicative modulus N
2
j , encryption function
Ej(x) = gxj r
Nj mod N2j and a corresponding decryption function Dj(). Aj
publishes on the bulletin board his encryption function and public key for
j = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Large primes p and q are chosen such that p = 2q + 1 and
nq2 < Nj for j = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Cyclic group G contains all the quadratic-
residues in Z∗p and has an order q. Random primes f , g and h are chosen
such that logg f and logh g are unknown. The bid committing function is
Com(x) = fxgr mod p where x is a bidding choice in Zq and r is a random
integer in Zq. A sharing threshold parameter T smaller than m is chosen.
System parameters p, q, f , g, h, T and Nj for j = 1, 2, . . . ,m are published
on the bulletin board.
2. Bidding phase
Each bidder Bi selects his bidding vector (bi,1, bi,2, . . . , bi,w) as his choices
at p1, p2, . . . , pw where bi,l ∈ Zq for l = 1, 2, . . . , w. If he is willing to pay
pl, bi,l is a random non-zero integer modulo q; if he is unwilling to pay pl,
bi,l = 0. Then he signs and publishes ci,l = Com(bi,l) = f bi,lgri,l mod p for
l = 1, 2, . . . , w on the bulletin board where ri,l is randomly chosen from Zq.
3. Bid opening phase
(a) Bid randomization
Each auctioneer Aj publishes a commitment (e.g. one-way hash function)
of random integer Rj,i,l from Zq for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and l = 1, 2, . . . , w.
After all the commitments have been published, the auctioneers publish
Rj,i,l for j = 1, 2, . . . ,m as randomizing factors of bi,l on the bulletin
board.
(b) Secret sharing
Each Bi calculates Ri,l =
∑m
j=1Rj,i,l mod q. Then he calculates si,l =
ri,lRi,l mod q as his secret at pl for l = 1, 2, . . . , w. Bi chooses polyno-
mials Fi,l(x) =
∑T
k=0 ai,l,kx
k mod q for l = 1, 2, . . . , w where ai,l,0 = si,l
and ai,l,k for k = 1, 2, . . . , T are randomly chosen. Bi publishes encrypted
shares Si,l,j = Ej(Fi,l(j)) = g
Fi,l(j)
j t
Nj
i,l,j mod N
2
j for l = 1, 2, . . . , w and
j = 1, 2, . . . ,m on the bulletin board where ti,l,j is randomly chosen
from Z∗Nj . Bi publishes sharing commitments Ci,l,k = h
ai,l,k mod p for
l = 1, 2, . . . , w and k = 0, 1, . . . , T on the bulletin board.
(c) Binary search
The auctioneers cooperate to perform a binary search. At a price pl on
the searching route, the following operations are performed.
i. Share verification
Each Aj calculates his summed shares vj,l = Dj(
∏n
i=1 Si,l,j mod N
2
j )
and the corresponding commitments ul,k =
∏n
i=1 Ci,l,k mod p for
k = 0, 1, . . . , T . He then verifies hvj,l =
∏T
k=0 u
jk
l,k mod p. If the ver-
ification is passed, he goes on to next step. Otherwise, he verifies
hDj(Si,l,j) =
∏T
k=0 C
jk
i,l,k mod p for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and will meet at
least one failed verification. If the verification fails when i = I, Aj ac-
cuses bidder BI of submitting an invalid encrypted share SI,l,j . If BI
disputes on the accusation, the following dispute settling procedure
is used. Aj publishes zI,l,j = D(SI,l,j) such that anyone can verify
hzI,l,j 6=∏Tk=0 CjkI,l,k mod p. If hzI,l,j 6=∏Tk=0 CjkI,l,k mod p, BI has to
publish tI,l,j and proves his knowledge of loggj (SI,l,j/t
Nj
I,l,j) using the
zero knowledge proof of knowledge of logarithm in [11]1. BI asks the
1 Although the parameter setting in [11] is a little different from the parameter set-
ting in Paillier encryption (When [11] was proposed, Paillier encryption had not
appeared), the proof protocol in [11] can be applied here without compromising its
correctness, soundness or zero knowledge property.
auctioneers to verify his proof and SI,l,j 6= gzI,l,jj tNjI,l,j mod N2j . If
hzI,l,j =
T∏
k=0
Cj
k
I,l,k mod p ∨ (SI,l,j 6= gzI,l,jj tNjI,l,j mod N2j ∧BI ’s proof is correct),
the accusation against BI is wrong and Aj is removed. Otherwise, BI
is removed from the auction and may be punished; share verification
is run again.
ii. Homomorphic secret recovery
Each Aj publishes vj,l, whose validity can be verified by anyone
against Ci,l,k for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and k = 0, 1, . . . , T . If at least T + 1
summed shares are correct, the summed secret can be recovered. For
simplicity, suppose the first T + 1 summed shares are correct, then
the summed secret is recovered: dl =
∑n
i=1 si,l =
∑T+1
j=1 v
xj
j,l mod q
where xj =
∏
1≤k≤t+1,k 6=j
k
k−j mod q.
iii. Homomorphic bid opening
Equation
∏n
i=1 c
Ri,l
i,l = g
dl mod p is tested. If this equation is valid,
the sum of the randomized bidding choices at pl is zero, the binary
search at pj ends negatively and the search goes down. Otherwise,
the sum of randomized bidding choices at pl is not zero, the binary
search at pj ends positively and the search goes up.
In the end of the binary search, the winning price is found.
4. Winner identification phase
Suppose the winning price is pL. Decrypted shares di,L,j = Dj(Si,L,j) for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n are published. hdi,L,j =
∏T
k=0 C
jk
i,L,k mod p is verified for i =
1, 2, . . . , n and j = 1, 2, . . . ,m. If any bidder’s secret is found to be incorrectly
shared, he is removed from the auction and may be punished. If he disputes,
the dispute can be solved like in Step 3(c)i. If at least T+1 correct shares can
be found for Bi, his secret di,L can be recovered: di,L =
∑T+1
j=1 d
xj
i,L,j mod p
(For simplicity, assume the first T + 1 shares are correct). Then equation
c
Ri,L
i,L = g
di,L mod p is tested for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Only when cRi,Li,L 6= gdi,L mod
p, is Bi a winner. Suppose c
RI,L
I,L 6= gdI,L mod p. Then BI must prove that he
is really a winner by proving knowledge of logf (c
RI,L
I,L /g
dI,L) using the zero
knowledge proof of knowledge of logarithm in [11]. Any BI failing to give
this proof is a cheater and punished. The winner’s signature is verified and
his identity is published. If there is more than one winner, a new auction is
run among the winners.
In Table 1, the new secret-sharing-based first-bid auction scheme is compared
against the existing homomorphic secret-sharing-based first-bid auction schemes
[4, 6, 10]. It is clear that in the new scheme, two-round communication and com-
mitment prevent the ABC attack; the randomization prevents the BBC attack
and strenghens bid privacy; the dispute settling procedure prevents the dispute
attack.
Operation [4, 6, 10] New auction
the first round sharing bidding choice bi,l commiting bidding choice bi,l
of communication in ci,l = f
bi,lgri,l
the second round non-existent randomizing ri,l into si,l = ri,lRi,l
of communication and sharing si,l
bid opening recover
∑n
i=1
bi,l recover dl =
∑n
i=1
si,l
and test whether
∑n
i=1
bi,l > 0 and test whether
∏n
i=1
c
Ri,l
i,l = g
dl
dispute settlement non-existent or vulnerable solved by VSS and verifiable encryption
Table 1. Comparison of homomorphic secret-sharing-based first-bid auction schemes
5 Analysis
Security and efficiency of the new auction scheme is analysed in this section.
Readers can check that if the bidders and auctioneers follow the protocol, the
auction outputs a correct result. Note that although two different kinds of ad-
ditive modulus p and Nj are used in the protocol, no modulus conflict happens
as ri,l, Ri,l are chosen from Zq and nq2 < Nj .
5.1 Security Analysis
In the following, it is demonstrated that the auction is correct as long as at least
one auctioneer is honest.
Theorem 1. The auction protocol is correct with an overwhelmingly large prob-
ability if at least one auctioneer is honest. More precisely, the bidder with the
highest bid wins with an overwhelmingly large probability if at least one auction-
eer is honest.
To prove this theorem, the following three lemmas must be proved first.
Lemma 1. If
∑n
i=1 yisi = 0 mod q with a probability larger than 1/q for random
s1, s2, . . . , sn from Zq, then yi = 0 mod q for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Proof: Given any integer k in {1, 2, . . . , n}, there must exist integers s1, s2, . . . ,
sk−1, sk+1, . . . , sn in Zq and two different integers sk and sˆk in Zq such that the
following two equations are correct.
n∑
i=1
yisi = 0 mod q (1)
(
k−1∑
i=1
yisi) + yksˆk +
n∑
i=k+1
yisi = 0 mod q (2)
Otherwise, for any s1, s2, . . . , sk−1, sk+1, . . . , sn there is at most one sk to satisfy
equation
∑n
i=1 yisi = 0 mod q. This deduction implies among the q
n possible
combinations of s1, s2, . . . , sn, equation
∑n
i=1 yisi = 0 mod q is correct for at
most qn−1 combinations. This conclusion leads to a contradiction: given random
integers si from Zq for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, equation
∑n
i=1 yisi = 0 mod q is correct
with a probability no larger than 1/q.
Subtracting (2) from (1) yields
yk(sk − sˆk) = 0 mod q
Note that sk − sˆk 6= 0 mod q as sk 6= sˆk mod q. So, yk = 0 mod q. Note that
k can be any integer in {1, 2, . . . , n}. Therefore yi = 0 mod q for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. 2
Lemma 2. When the binary search at a price pl ends negatively, bi,l = 0 for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n with an overwhelmingly large probability if at least one auctioneer
is honest where bi,l is Bi’s choice at pl and committed in ci,l.
Proof: That the binary search at a price pl ends negatively implies
n∏
i=1
c
Ri,l
i,l = g
dl mod p
where dl is the summed secret recovered at pl. So
n∏
i=1
(f bi,lgri,l)Ri,l = gdl mod p
Namely
f
∑n
i=1
Ri,lbi,lg
∑n
i=1
Ri,lri,l = gdl mod p
Note that bi,l is committed in ci,l = f bi,lgri,l by Bi and dl is recovered from
the shares from the bidders. So the bidders can cooperate to find
∑n
i=1Ri,lbi,l,∑n
i=1Ri,lri,l and dl in polynomial time.
So, if
∑n
i=1Ri,lbi,l 6= 0, the bidders can cooperate to find in polynomial time
logg f = (dl −
n∑
i=1
Ri,lri,l)/
n∑
i=1
Ri,lbi,l,
which is contradictory to the assumption that logg f is unknown and the dis-
crete logarithm problem is hard to solve. So,
∑n
i=1Ri,lbi,l = 0. Note that Ri,l for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n are random integers in Zq as they are corporately chosen by the
auctioneers, at least one of which is honest. Therefore, according to Lemma 1.
bi,l = 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n with an overwhelmingly large probability. 2
Lemma 3 guarantees that no bidder can change a “YES bid into a “NO bid.
Lemma 3. If the binary search at a price pl ends positively, then there exists I
in {1, 2, . . . , n} such that one of the following two statements is true: 1) bI,l 6= 0;
2) bI,l = 0 but BI cannot find logf (c
RI,l
I,l /g
dI,l) in polynomial time.
Proof: That the binary search at a price pl ends positively implies
n∏
i=1
c
Ri,l
i,l 6= gdl mod p
where dl is the summed secret recovered at pl.
Soundness and homomorphism of the employed VSS [8] guarantees that
hdl = ul,0 =
n∏
i=1
Ci,l,0 mod p
So,
n∏
i=1
c
Ri,l
i,l 6= glogh
∏n
i=1
Ci,l,0 mod p
Namely,
n∏
i=1
c
Ri,l
i,l 6= g
∑n
i=1
logh Ci,l,0 mod p,
which implies
n∏
i=1
c
Ri,l
i,l 6=
n∏
i=1
glogh Ci,l,0 mod p
So there must exists integer I such that 1 ≤ I ≤ n and
c
RI,l
I,l 6= glogh CI,l,0 mod p
Suppose glogh CI,l,0/(cRI,lI,l ) = f
eI , then eI 6= 0 mod q. So
c
RI,l
I,l = f
eIglogh CI,l,0 mod p
Namely
(f bI,lgrI,l)RI,l = feIglogh CI,l,0 mod p
where bi,l is Bi’s choice at pl, which is committed in ci,l.
Note that BI knows bI,l and rI,l as he committed to bI,l as cI,l = f bI,lgrI,l ;
BI can find logh CI,l,0 in polynomial time as his shares at pj enable anyone to
calculates logh CI,l,0 in polynomial time. So, if BI can find eI in polynomial
time, he can find logg f = (logh CI,l,0 − rI,lRI,l)/(bI,lRI,l − eI) in polynomial
time. So, when bI,l = 0 either a contradiction to the assumption that logg f is
unknown and the discrete logarithm problem is hard to solve is found or BI
cannot find eI = logf (c
RI,l
I,l /g
dI,L). Therefore, there exists I in {1, 2, . . . , n} such
that one of the following two statements is true.
– bI,l 6= 0;
– bI,l = 0 but BI cannot find logf (c
RI,l
I,l /g
dI,l) in polynomial time.
2
Proof of Theorem 1:
Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 guarantee that if there is at least one honest auctioneer
– when a bidder submits a “YES” choice at a price, he can open it as a “NO”
choice with an overwhelmingly small probability;
– when a bidder bi submits a “NO” choice at a price pl but opens it as a “YES”
choice, he cannot find logf (c
Ri,l
i,l /g
di,l) in polynomial time.
So the binary search guarantees that if there is at least one honest auctioneer
– when a bidder submitted a “YES” choice at a price on the searching route,
the search always go upwards at that price with an overwhelmingly large
probability;
– when a bidder bi submitted a “NO” choice at a price pl on the search-
ing route, either the search always go downwards at pl or he cannot find
logf (c
Ri,l
i,l /g
di,l) in polynomial time.
So when winning price pL is determined in the bid opening phase,
– there is no “YES” choice at higher prices with an overwhelmingly large
probability if there is at least one honest auctioneer;
– if there is at least one honest auctioneer, then at the winning price
• either there is at least one “YES” choice,
• or a bidder Bi submits “NO” choice at pL, open it as “YES”, but cannot
find logf (c
Ri,L
i,L /g
di,L) in polynomial time.
Note that in the winner identification phase, any bidderBI opening his choice
as “Yes” at the winning price must prove that he is really a winner by proving
knowledge of logf (c
RI,L
I,L /g
dI,L). So in the winner identification phase either
some winner or some cheating bidder is identified with an overwhelmingly
large probability if there is at least one honest auctioneer. If a winner is
found, the auction ends correctly. If only cheating bidder(s) is found, the
cheating bidder is removed and the auction runs again. Finally a correct
winner can be definitely found when all the cheating bidders have been
removed.
2
If a penalty to identified cheating bidders is applied, the bidders will be
deterred from cheating and re-running can be avoided. If no strong penalty is
available and the re-running mechanism after finding a cheating bidder is not
appropriate in some special applications, the auction protocol can be slightly
modified so that the winning price found in the bid opening phase is always
correct and a real winner can always be found at the winning price. Only a
simple additional operation is needed in the modification: each bidder has to
prove that his submitted bid hidden by Com() is consistent with the secret
shares provided by him in the bid opening phase. In the proof Bi shows that at
each biddable price pl he knows two secrets bi,l and ri,l such that ci,l = f bi,lgri,l
and Ci,l,0 = hri,lRi,l without revealing bi,l or ri,l. This proof can be built on ZK
proof of knowledge of logarithm [11] and ZK proof of equality of logarithms [2].
With this modification Lemma 3 can be modified to Lemma 4, which is simpler.
Lemma 4. If the binary search at a price pl ends positively, then there exists I
in {1, 2, . . . , n} such that bI,l 6= 0.
The proof of Lemma 4 is simpler than that of Lemma 3, so is not provided here.
With this modification and Lemma 4, Theorem 1 can be proved more easily,
winner identification becomes simpler and rerunning can be avoided. However,
bidding becomes less efficient with additional O(nw) ZK proof and verification
operations. In most cases, we believe that punishment can deter the bidders from
cheating and rerunning can be avoided. So usually, this additional proof is not
adopted for the sake of efficiency, which is assumed in efficiency analysis later.
Auction Correct- Bid confi- Fairness Unchan- Public Bid Robust-
schemes -ness -dentiality -geability verifiability privacy -ness
[3] Vulnerable Trust -de Trust -de No Yes No Yes
to attacks -pendent -pendent
[4] Vulnerable Trust de- Trust de- No No Trust de- No
[6] to attacks -pendent -pendent -pendent
[10] Vulnerable Trust de- Trust de- Yes Yes Trust de- No
to attacks -pendent -pendent -pendent
New Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Trust de- Yes
auction -pendent
Table 2. Property comparison
As the commitment function Com() is information-theoretically hiding, bid
confidentiality is information-theoretically achieved and the ABC attack is information-
theoretically prevented. Binding of Com() and usage of digital signature guar-
antees unchangeability. As the bidding choices are randomized before they are
summed up, the BBC attack can be prevented if at least one auctioneer is honest.
The employed VSS [8] and the new dispute settling procedure2 in Step 3(c)i can
solve the dispute attack. With these three attacks prevented, the new auction
protocol is fair and robust. Every operation in the auction protocol is publicly
2 A honest bidder can successfully settle a dispute as it is impossible to encrypt two
different messages into the same ciphertext in Paillier encryption.
verifiable. If the number of malicious auctioneers is not over the sharing thresh-
old, bid privacy can be achieved.
A property comparison of the secret-sharing-based sealed-bid e-auction schemes
is provided in Table 2. [3] cannot achieve bid privacy and public verifiability at
the same time. It is assumed in Table 2 that public verifiability, a more important
property is achieved while bid privacy is sacrificed.
5.2 Efficiency Analysis
An efficiency comparison of the secret-sharing-based sealed-bid e-auction schemes
is provided in Table 3. In Table 3, full-length exponentiations are counted, where
Paillier encryption and RSA signature are assumed to be employed. It is illus-
trated in the two tables that compared to the previous secret-sharing-based
sealed-bid e-auction schemes, the new scheme does not compromise efficiency
while achieving much better properties. It is even more efficient than [10].
Auction schemes bidder auctioneer
[3] 3 2n+ 1
[4, 6] 2mw + 1 1 + 2n+ 2 log2 w
[10] (2T + 2 + 4m)w + 1 1 + 6n+ 6 log2 w
New auction (T + 3 + 2m)w + 1 1 + 5n+ 5 log2 w
Table 3. Efficiency comparison
6 Conclusion
A new secret-sharing-based first-bid e-auction scheme is proposed. It can achieve
all the desired properties for sealed-bid auctions at a reasonable cost. Moreover,
attacks existing in the current secret-sharing-based sealed-bid e-auction schemes
are prevented in the new scheme.
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